Introduction
This paper considers the implications for welfare of changes in the availability of capital income tax instruments in a world economy with cross-ownership of firms.
In the open economy, capital income taxation can generally be levied according to either the residence principle or the source principle, or both.t Capital income taxation according to the residence principle implies the taxation of savings, whereas if the source principle is applied, this is tantamount to taxation of investment. Of course, this cíistinction is immaterial for a closed economy, but it is crucial in the open economy. where a saving tax and an investrnent tax are verv different instruments.
Hence, u-hether an opcn economy has access to only one of these tax instruments in lien of both should in general irnpinge on welfare in that country.
Che issue of a~ailability of capital income tax instrurnents is an important one, or~-rele~ant for tax polic~~in today's worlcí economy. Capital has beconre increasiogly rnobile. due to changes in policy and to decreasing transactions costs associated cith financial placements abroad by firrns ancí indi~.iduals. Since at the sarne tirne t.here are~irtuallc no international agreE~rnents as to the exchange of tax information bet~ceen countries, it has become easy for individuals in many countries to conca~al the mtmn on their foreign securities and cíepostits from domestic authorities. "I'hereb~, domestic sa~ers can escape saeing taxation by simply relocating Cuuds abrond. .-1s a result. residence-based capital income taxation is under threat and ma~. ocer time be rendered completely ine(fective. Instead of having access to both sourccand residence-based capital income taxes, countries would tben in effect onl~~ha~~e source-based taxes left.~~"ould this development itnply a decrease in welfare on the part of countries in the world economy'.
I~o answer this question, it appears important to introduce a few realist.ic features of the international econorny as of today. Pirst, despite several attempts there is verc little coordination of capital income tax policies in the world economy.`ot ecen in the EC has it become possible, to achieve any tneasurable degree of coordination bettceen member states.1 In setting their capital income tax policy, countries basically~corry about domestic effects of dornestic taxes (rather than their international effects). whilc taking the tax policies of other countries as given. 3[oreo~-er. therc is as said close to no exchange of information between tax authorities in different countries on capital income accruing to foreigners. In consequence. capital income tax policies in the international economv are best characteriLed as non-cooperatire. 5econd, two additional characteristics of the world economv seem crucial. iowhere in the world does one find full taxation of pure profits or rents (return to fixed factors). On the contrary, rates of tax on pure profits seem to be contAtcording to the residence principle, tapital income is taxed where it is received, whereas following the source principle, it is taxed where it originates.
zFor instance, the main recommendations in the Ruding Report (1992) have never been tarried ou [. 1 strained to effective levels well below one hundred percent. These limitations on profit tasation may have to do with an inability to distinguish pure profits from the ordinary return to capital, or with a fear that in the end, pure profits result from entrepreneurial efTort which may not be in entirely inflexible supply. Further, in industrialized countries there is a significant degree of foreign ownership of domestic firms and, vice versa, domestic ownership of foreign firms. The reasons for this crossou~nership can be many, but the unimpeded mobility of capital across countries has been instrumental in establishing the cross-ownership pattern.
Vhen firms with a partly international ownership generate pure profits, income fíows between countries will feature not onl}' ordinary return to capital, but also cross-country profit fiows. Since countries via their capital income (and profit) taxes are able to affect the size of outgoing aíter-tax profit flows, non-cooperative capital income taxation will generate international externalities, entailing ine[bciencies in tax policy as seert from the world as a whole. Given this insight, would it really be detritnental for indi~~idual countries if the}' w'ere to lose the sa~~ing tax instrument. i.e. if they moved from non-cooperative tax polic} with both source and residence taxes to non-cooperati~~e tax policy~eith only source taxes available?
[n principle. the effective loss of one oF the two capital income tax instrurnents can also be brought about if the world's countries w~ere to agree on exclusive application of the residenre pt'itltiple or the source principle in capital incorne taxation. For conrpleteness. we therefore also wish to investigate what would happen if the world~s countries w.ere to move frorn a situation with both saving and investntent taxes acailable to a situation in which they effectively have access to just residence-based taxes on saving.
'Ihe main result of the paper is that tmder certain conditions the loss o( residencebased taxation of saving will be beneficial for countries in the world economy. Apart from incornplete profit taxation and cross-ownership of firms, the requirement for this to hold is that preferences for public goods are not too strong. The intuition for the result is as follows: The presence of cross-country profit flows leads to a desire on the part of governtnents to snatch part of the profits accruing to foreign owners of domestic firms. With lirnited profit taxes this is accomplished bc means of source-based investment taxes, resulting in overtaxation oE capital income relative to taxation under coordination. [f saving taxes are eliminated, then capital incorne will as a whole be less heavily taxed, }~íelding a better approximation to taxation under coordination. This reasoning applies when preferences for public goods are not too strong; otherwise, the negative international externality associated w-ith the beggar-thy-neighbor tax w~ill be offset by a more subtle positive externality operating through the income effect of international taxation on national saving.3
Given the possibility of a positive welfare effect of losing residence-based capital income taxation, it may not make a lot of sense for the world's countries to spend vast resources to combat evasion of saving taxation (unless perhaps internal redistibution is the preeminent goal of tax policy). 3Details on this latter externality are provided later on.
In a similar way w'c also demonstrate in the paper that if countries in the world were to agree on exclusive use of residence-based capital income taxation (while abolishing source-based taxes), then such an international agreement could actually be welCare-improving.4
Despite the importance and policy relevance of the problem, the literature on capital income taxation in open economies has until now not focused on the welfare implications of restrictions on the set of feasible capital income tax instruments in a setting with cross-owncrship of firms. All the same, it is helpful to review key contributions to the literature. Several authors have examined the optimal capital income taxation in a small open economy. An important result in Gordon (1986), Frenkel et al. ( L991) and others is that a small economy optimally does not levy a source-based investment tax if the tax instrument set is not restricted.~~~'ith a restricted profit tax, however, source-based investment taxes are generally optimally applied. Iluizinga and v ielsen (199 ï) examine in detail how the desired mix of saving and investment and profit taxes in this setting depends on the feasibilit}~of profit taxation and on the extent of Coreign ownership of domestic firms. Foreign ow~nership renders im'estrnent and profit taxation more attractive relative to saving taxation. and thc optimal sign of saving taxation may even be negative.
;1 relati~el~-small literature exarnines whether there is a need to coordinate capital income f axes internationally. Razin and Sadka (1991) consider a model where labor and capital are inputs into a production Cunction with constant returns to scale. Thec show-that t~co countries have no reason to coordinate either saving or invesment taxes iC thec take the world interest rate as given. Bucovetsky and~~'ilson (1991) consider labor. saving and in~~estment taxes in a similar model. but they let the world interest rate be endogenous. They find, anrong other things, that countries hace no neecí to coordinate co-existing saving and investment taxes, w~hile Krelove (1992) finds that the coordination of investment taxes alone may entail either a lower or a higher investment tax.
Following the discussion of international capital income tax coordination (cfr. OECD (1991), the Ruding Report (1992) . and Serensen (1993)), we in Huizinga and lielsen (1996) extend our small open economy model to examine the scope for tax coordination in a model of many symmetric small countries.~Ve show that when profits are fully taxed or there is no foreign ow'nership, noncooperative joint saving and in~~estment taxes are in fact optimal. In other instances, there generally is a need to coordinate capital income taxes, as one country's tax policy has first order implications for any other country's pricate welfare or tax revenues. í3uilding on the above work, this paper focuses on a symmetric multi-country world with cross-ownership of firms and examines how welfare in each country depends on the feasible tax instrument set. The analysis presupposes that countries do QAn international agreement of this kind would probably need to be backed up by a commitment technology, since otherwise it would be in any single country's interest to reintroduce the sourcebased tax. Also, the argument presupposes that an international agreement on the tax instument set may be feasible where an agreement on the rates of taxation is not. not coordinate their tax policies. To be precise, we compare the welfare of each indi-'idual country' in the`ash tax-setting equilibria across various models that differ in the set of available tax instrurnents. 'I'he tax instrument set in principle consists of a (limited) profit tax, a sa~~ing tax and an in~estrnertt tax. .A restricted tax instrument set is taken to be an instrument set that does not include either a saving tax or an in~'estment tax. "I'he paper specifically focuses on comparing a setting in which both saving and in~'estment taxation are feasible with settings where only one of these is feasible.
11'e organize the paper as folloivs. Section 2 considers the mix of sa~.ing, investrnent and profit taxation that is optimal from the perspective of a single countryt hat can lev}~a limited profit tax. It also considers optimal tax policy in the small open economy'. if either the saving tax or the investment tax is unavailable. Section :3 instead examines optimal tax policy for a closed econonrv that itnposes a single tax wedge between the gross return to investment and the uet return to saving. 5ections l and :3 are prerequisites for the welfare comparison of~arious tax regimes in section }. For a gi~'en (limited) (easibility' of profit taxation and a given cross-ownership of firms.~~'e consider two~celfare comparisons: i) joint saving and investment taxation against oulc in~cstment taxation, and ii) joint sa~~ing and im~estment taxation a-;aiust onl~sa~iug tasation. :1s special cases, we also briefly~consider that profits are fully tazed, or there is no cross-owernship of firms. Section 5 concludes.
2 Tax policy in the small open economy 'I'his section cxamines tl~e optimal capital incoene tax policy frotn the perspecti~e of a small open econo[ny~. The analysis in this section corresponds to Huizinga a,nd ielsen (Ip97) with the exception that in this paper we do not consider thc possibility of government lump surn income transfers to domestic citizens, and that public qoods supply. is endogenously rather than exogenously determined. "The section first outlines the basic modeL It then considers optimal tax policy in turn for the cascs where (a) saving. in~'estment and profit taxes are all available, (b) only~investment and protit taxes are acailable, and (c) only sa~~ing and profit taxes are a~~ailable. Consumers also enjoy a public good, G, provided b~. the government in the second period. To finance this public good, the government can impose a sacing tax at the rate u, and an investment tax at the rate u, both payable in the second period. In addition. second period firm profits are taxed at a rate r. Profits are positive because there is some factor of production, e.g. land or entrepreneurial services, in inelastic supply or, alternaticely, there are decreasing returns to scale in capital investments. I'he investrnent tax bill, al~, is deductible from taxable profits. The profit tax rate, . cannot exceed a maximum of~C I. There are no other restrictions on the sizes or signs of the three taxes. u, i~, and ;. Finally,~~-e assume that a firm and thus its profit stream are in part foreign-o~cned. In particular. let us assume that a share n~0 of each country.'s firtns is owned by forcigners. Concersely, domestic citirens oK-n a total share of ct' o[ (oreign firms.
The basic model
['irms produce an output F(L~) in the second period, where the production function h' is assumed to be strictly concare. Firrns~after-tax profits are equal to
. where 1 f r f t~is the user cost of capitaL~I~hcm aximization of profits on the part of firrns yiclds the following optimal in~estment rttlc.
Iluuschold, face the follotving t~eo-period budget constraint,
chere stars denote foreign~.ariables.'
Consumers deri~~e utilit~-from consurnption in both periods and from the public good. C. Lifetinte utilit}~is assumed to be additivel~-separable, and is~critten as (.~(Ct. Cz)f 6`(G). The first order condition regarding the private consumption choice is as follows.~t
The budget constraint of the go~-ernment stipulates that overall tax recenues eyual the provision of the public good, G, as follows,
OGG'-nSfvlí-{-z(F(I~)-(l~r~c)lí~(2..1)
I'ax policy is set so as to maximize the utility o( thc representati~.e agent. Pormallc, the governrnent, faces the problern of choosing the tax rates z, u and r so as to maximize the follo~cing Lagrangean expression,
5`ote that profits earned abroad qua domestic ownership of foreign firms are not taxed at home, so deductibility or creditabilí[} oC(oreign profit taxes is irrelevant. In effect, the profit tax is solely source-based. Further, the profit tax does not discriminate between (oreign and domestic owners o( domes[ic hrms. T'hese assumptions could be altered without significantly affecting qualitative results.
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where ,~and p are Lagrange multipliers associated with the government budget constraint ('?.4) and the upper bound on the profit tax, z. The first order conditions regarding the tax rates~, u and v and the volume of public goods, G, associated with (2.5) can be stated as follows,
where e~, --(dlí~dr)~I~is the semi-elasticity of investment with respect to the in~estment tax r. e" --(dS~du)~S is the uncompensated semi-elasticitr of saving with respect to the sa~-ing tax u, and p denotes the propensity to consume in the first. period out of serond period income. [t can be seen that eu -e" f p~0 is the compensated semi-elasticity of saving with respect to the saving tax, u. The nncompensated semi-elasticity e" will also be taken to be positive in what follows.
Tbe Gc~t arder eonditions ( 2.6)-(2.9) form thc hasis nf the descripGi4n of optimal tax policy~in the cases where all three tax instruments are available, or where either thc saving tax or the im'estment tax are not part of the instrument set. E3elow, we briefl~~characterize the optimal tax policy in the three cases in three subsections.s Tlnoughout this section, we maintain the assumptions of a~0 and i G 1. i.c. that there is some cross-ownership of firms and that profits can only be taxed incompletely, which ensures that there is a positive profit fiow from domestic firms to foreign residents. :-1t the end of section 4, we briefly. discuss the cases where either a-0 or -1.
All tax instrutnents available
From conditions (`l.6)-(2.9), the optimal saving tax, u, can be seen to be eithcr positi~~e or negative, while the im.estment tax, v, is always non-negative. The exact sizes of the capital income taxes depend on the desired level of public goods and on the maximum profit tax rate, z. Five separate cases in increasing public goods demand can be distinguished as follows:
In case i), the maximum profit tax rate, i, is not binding and the marginal cost of public funds, r~-a~U2, is less than one at r~-(1-a)eu~(eu-ap). The saving tax is negative at u--a~ ((1 -a) eu], while the investment tax v is zero. The negative saving tax enables the tax authorities to redistribute foreign profit income, as taxed 6A more detailed distussion can be found in Iluizinga and Nielsen (1996) . via the proftt tax, to dornestic residents.' In the borderline case ii), the profit tax constraint z is just binding so that we have u G 0 and e-0 as in case i) w-ith the marginal cost of funds (~ICPF) also as in case i). In the intermediate case iii), preferences for public goods are so strong that the investrnent tax contributes as a substitute profit tax to finance the public goods provision and the saving subs-idv, tvhile the~IC'PF remains below unity. 1ext, in case iv) the saving tax rate, u, is just equal to zero. and the cost of funds, rl, equals unity, while the inv.estment tax rate is at the national income maximizing value of a-a(1 -i)~e,,. Finally, in case v) both sacing and investment taxes are positive with the i`'ICPF exceeding one.
The various possible combinations of optimal tax rates with all three instruments available are illustrated in Figure 1. panel ( a) . Thc tax rates are there depicted as fituctions oC the marginal cost of public funds which functions as an indicator of the strcngth of preferences Cor public goods.
Only investment and profit taxation
absent the sacing tax. optimal tax policy is Cound from equations ('2.6). (2.i)) aud (2.9). ccith u set cyual to zero in (2.6) and (2.8).
Some inspection receals that three cases r.an he rlistingnished. Fnr relativel~' r~eak preferences for public goods. onl}. the profit tax, z, will be used (at a rate belotc the maximum rate :) in the noncooperative equilibrium with t~-0. The rnarginal cost of public funds theu is p-(I -a). [n the second case. the profit tax constraint is just binding. while r and q are still equal to 0 and 1-a, respectivelc.~~~ith eren stronger preferences for public goods, the country sets the profit tax at its maximum and the in~~estment tax. u, abov~e zero, resulting in a~ICPF exceeding 1-a. [n t}iis third case, the investment tax, r, can be v,-ritten in terms of t.he~[C'PF as c' -(1 -~)~1 -l1 -a)~O~~e~- 
Only saving and profit taxatioñ
4'ithout an investmettt tax (perhaps due to some international agreement), the first order conditions (2.6). (2.7) and (2.9) with t~-0 characterize the optimal sa~-ing and profit tax rates and the optimal provision of public goods.
:lgain. three cases in increasing preferences for public goods provision can be distinguished. The first case has an underused profit tax, i.e. z G z, a negative 'To be exact, Che existence of this and the subsequent case requires i 7 oh'~(e~(1 -Q)(F(h') -( I} rll~)~. i.c. a relatively high maximum profit tax rate, high saving elasticity, and low foreign ownership share. This condition is taken to hold without any implication For our conclusions.
saving tax at u--n~[(1 -n)eu] G 0. and a marginal cost of public funds at q-(1 -n)e;,~(eu -np]. In this instance, the pressure to finance public goods is so low that some pro(it tax revenues are used to finance a negative saving tax so as to redistribute income to ciomestic residents.~1 borderline case then follows where the profit tax constraint is just. binding and~chere the values of the saving tax rate ancí thc`(CPF as in the previous case.`~'ith even stronger preference for public goods, the profit tax rate conatraint is stricll~-binding, and the saving tax increases e~~entually to a positi~e levcl. -Che~[CP1~similarly rises from thc vahte given abo~~c.
otc that rvith a saving tax equal to zero. the~ICPF just equals unit~~.
Thc possible configurations oE profit anci sa~.ing tax rates in the ahsence of thc investmenl. tax are illustrated in Figurc 1. panel (c).
3 Tax policy in the closed economy fn this scction.~~'e consirler the optimal capital iucome and profit tax polic~in a closcd cconom~'. 1'he closed economy is taken to be identical to the single small upen econom~considered in the precious section. Obviously. the closed econotn~~s a~in,~and in~~estment have to be equal, i.a ti-Ií. The closed econom}'~s tax polic~curresportds to the coordinated tax policy-in a world oE man}~identical small opeu econornies. This sectiun lh~c~Eore sets the stage for the later~celfarr cvalnation uf dilferent noncooperati~r tax regimes in section~1.8 ln the closecl econotm'. thc tas authorit~-has a single tax instnuncnt. .r. to introduce a rccrlge betaeen the gross return to investment and the nct return tõ a~ing. I'hr tax c can be thought t.o be levied on saving so that the nct return to sa~.ing i, r-a~.~~'hilt: r is the return to im'estment and the market ratc of interest. s before. the tax authority can tax profits at a rate z C~.
Profit maximiration on thc part of firms nov,.~.ields the following in~'estmeut nrle.
('r(K) -1 t r (3.1)
Ilic budget constraints for private agents and thc gocernntent are gi~'en b}-,
lgain, the gov-ernment r.hooses tax polic~-, i.e. the tax rates .r and z. so as to maximize the utilit}~oC the representati~.e agent. The optimalit}~conditions with "I;y fucusing on symmetric countries we concentrate on average externalities between countries in non-cooperative tax policy eyuilibria. The implications of as}'mmetry for tax competition have been studird hy, e.g.. Bucovetsky (1991) i3 respect to the two tax instruments, z and r, and the provision of public goods, C, are as follotvs,
lu these expressions, e, --(dS~dr)~S is the semi-elasticity of saving~~-ith respect to the tax wedge. r, accounting for any endogenous change in the interest rate. The semi-elasticity~e:, can be expressed as follows.
t. the sa~~iuq-investtnent balance implies tlrat dr~dr ean be found as.
so ihat r,, can be~critten as.
e,.e"
3)
Oplintality~conditious (3.!) and (3.:~j take into account that unlike in the small open economy changes in either the protit tax. :, or the capital income tax. .r, affect the interest rate r. 'hhc change in ihe interest rate independentl}~affects econontic beha~ior and also ocerall capital income tax revenues.
[~ndcrlying the optimality conditions (3.-4)-(3.6), we can distinguish three optimal t ax re~imes that differ in the extent to which the maximum profit tax rate is binding. For rather weak preferences for public goods, the optimal profit tax is less than its marimwn z and the capital income tax wedge, x, is rero. In a borderline case, the profit tax constraint is just binding. i.e. z-~. whilc the tax wedge, r, rcmains cyual to rero.~;ext, the profit tax limitation is strictly binding, and the authorities meet an~' additional tax rccenue need~eith a positice capital income tax, r. The general strateg~. of conrparing welfare in two tax regimes -call them a and 6 -is as follows.`~'c~start out with a certain strength of preferences for public goods, as proxied by the marginal cost of public funds in regime n. This~ICPE corresponds tu certain rates of saving and investment tax and thereby a certain w.edge betwecn the gross return to invest ment and the net return to saving.~Ve then investigate whether. gi~'en the`[CYF. regime a is preferable to the other regime b. fhe wa}õ ur tnodel has been set up implies that welEare in a single eountry w~ill be concace in the sa~'ing-in~rstcucut tax~ecdga Flence, if the tax wedge in regime n is rlnsttr to the teedge under coordittation than is the wedge in regime 6, and the differences bett~'oen each of the non-cooperati~'e tax tvedges and the coordinated tax wedge are of the same sign. then regirne a is incieecí preferable to regime b.
Consequcntlc, for reginres n and h we ueed the answers to three questions: i) going from regimc n to full international tax coordination, do countries increase or reduce the o~'crall sa~'ing-investment tax w'edge, r-u-~t;? ii) going from regime b to full coordination, do countries-increase or reduce the ocerall saving-investment tax w~edge? aud iii) going from regitne n to regime b, do countries increase or redure the overall sa~ing-investment tax wedge? Combining the answers to the three yuestions. we may or mat' not be able to unambiguoush~rank national welfares in regirnes o and b.~1 b formalize the welfare comparison based on tax tvedges, let us introduce the following notation: a."`' is the`ash equilibrium tax wedge with both tax instrumcnts available. while .ru and .r" are the`ash eyuilibrium values of u and t~with only the sacin,g and investment taxes available, respectivelv. Pinally, s' is the fully~coordi-nated tax wedge in all three situations-t'. Similarly., pu`' r~u p~and q' denote the 9There is a tradition in the international tax literature o( comparing the pure source and residence principles of capital income tax, cfr for example Giovannini (1989) . This~could here correspond to comparing only saving taxation to only investment taxation. roQuestions i) and ii) in reality toncern the scope for international tax coordination and are also addressed in our companion paper, Huizinga and~ielsen (1996). rAnd hence equal to the saving (or investment) tax rate in the corresponding closed economy (perceived) marginal costs of funds in the four cases. "I'he switch from regime a, which can be the uv, u, v or~regime, to a different regime b leads to a larger tax wedge, if given .z' the regime switch lowers the (perceived) marginal cost of public funds,~6~~n (4.1)
Equivalently, rb in regime b is to be increased beyond~a, if the (perceived) increase in utility resulting from more public goods dominates the (perceived) reduction in utility resulting frorn less private consumption. Formally, this is Lhe case if.tz
ahere the superscripts refer to the two tax regimes a and b under comparison, and the subscripts indicate that the value of the tax wedge in the original tax regime a. i.e. .ca, is to be inserted into the marginal expressions for the two tax regimes. The right. hand side of the inequality in (-l.l') contains the ratio between the marginal utilit~-gain from extra public goods and the marginal utility loss from less private goods, ass-ociated with a unit increase in the saving-investment tax wedge from .z'. 13~-definition. this ratio must be equal to one for xa to be optimal in regime a.
Both saving and investment taxation vs. only the latter
[ovl countries de jure impose a residence-based tax on the capita] income of their domestic residents. In practice, however, the residential capital income tax is ofteu easil~' evaded. 1'ax evasion of this kind mav effectivelv eliminate the residence-based capital incorne tax altogether. as cotnmunication and transportation costs decline.1~3 To asses the welfare consequences of a demise of the residential capital income tax. we fïrst have to answer three questions: i) how does .xuv compare to r`for different values of the marginal cost of public funds, rf", in thc investment-tax-only regime.' ii) how does r" compare to x' for different values of p`'? and finally, (iii) how does a~~`' compare to s" for different valucs of q"'.~' ith noncooperative sacing and investment taxes set optimally, each countrc is indifferent between generating tax revenues at the margin by the saving or the investment tax instrumeut. For convenience, any increase in the wedge. r. in any indi~-idual economy can be thought to come about through a higher sacing tax. u.
[~sing ('l.7) and (3.~), we can then evaluate (.t.l) to find that coordination of saving ï ) and (2.8) to express the saving tax, u, as a ftmction of  the overall tax wedge. r. in the saving-cum-investment tax regime as Collotvs,   e~-r -(1 -z)a   u -e,. -~( 1 -c )( 1 -n) From (4.6), we infer that for large values of v the saving-investment tax wedge in the coordinated equilibrium is even greater than in the investment-tax-only regime. Underlying (4.6), there are two opposing externalities of national investment tax policy. First, the investment tax as usual affects foreign welfare negatively to the extent that the investment tax is borne by the foreign owners of domestic firms. This spill-over points towards an overly high investment tax in the absence of coordination. Second, a higher investment tax causes a lower international interest rate, leading to a worldwide rise in investment and thus foreign investment tax revenues. 'I'his second spill-over tends to a noncoordinated investment tax that is too low. Formula (4.6) indicates that the second externality dominates for relatively high noncooperative investment tax rates, and vice versa. '
Equivalently to (4.6), going from the investment-tax-only regime to full coordination leads to an increase in the overall saving-investment tax wedge if the marginal cost oí funds, rlv, in the first instance exceeds a certain critical level as follows,
In deriving ( 4.7), (2.8) is used to express the investment tax rate in the v regime as a function of the marginal cost of public funds in that regime. Substituting into (4.6) then yields (4.7).
What remains is to compare the size of the saving-investment tax wPrlge in the noncooperative regimes with co-existing saving and investment taxes and with only an investment tax. To start, let us consider that preferences for public goods are sufficiently strong that in the investment-tax-only regime the marginal cost of funds, rl~, exceeds unity so that the investment tax rate exceeds the national income maximizing value of a (1 -z)~e" ( cfr. (2.8) ). The introduction of the saving tax instrument then implies that the authorities gain access to an initially non-distortionary tax instrument. The saving tax thus will be set at a positive rate to finance additional public goods, while the investment tax rate declines. The marginal cost of public funds falls ( but remains above unity), in the sense that 1 G r~"v G n" for the given strength of preferences for public goods, and the overall saving-investment tax wedge rises.
Alternatively, we can consider that preferences for public goods are weak enough that the marginal cost of funds, rl", in the investment-tax-only regime initially is less than unity. Then the introduction of the saving tax instrument leads to the provision of a saving subsidy to domestic residents, a cut-back in public goods provision, a higher marginal cost of public funds, a higher investment tax and a lower overall saving-investment tax wedge. In summary, we conclude that,'" a(1 -z)
x"" ) xv iff rtu~1, i.e. iff x"~( 4.8) The information regarding the relative sizes of thc saving-investment tax wedges in the saving-cum-investment-tax regime and the investment-tax-only regime (relative to each other and relative to a regime of full international coordination) is graphed in Figure 3 . The horizontal axis in Figure 3 shows the marginal cost of public funds for the investment-tax-only regime. A varyíng MCPF proxies for varying strength of preferences for public goods. The vertical axis depicts the size of the saving-investment tax wedge in the three regimes, as functions of the preferences for public goods. The figure contains three curves. First, the .zv-curve depicts the saving-investment tax wedge in the investment-tax-only regime as related to the marginal cost of pubGc funds, pv, in this regime. This curve shows that xv becomes positive, once the marginal cost of public funds, r~", exceeds 1-a and generally increases with r)v. Second, the x'-curve represents the fully coordinated tax wedge as related to the marginal cost of funds rw. Reftecting (4.7), we see that x' exceeds x~if r~~exceeds 1 t a(1 -z)e"~[e"~(1 -z)p], and vice versa. Third, the xuu-curve pictures the noncoordinated tax wedge in the saving-cum-investment tax regime against the cost of funds rlu. Reflecting (4.8), the latter curve is situated above the xu-curve for values of r~u exceeding unity, and vice versa. The particular value of rw, denoted r~', at which the x'-curve crosses the xuv curve from below is also shown in the figure. It exceeds 1~a(1 -z)e"~[e" f(1 -z)p] and corresponds to a value of pu" of 1~-e"~p, cfr. -(1 -z)p) ]. Given that welfare is concave in the saving-investment tax wedge and maximized in the~regime, it follows that for preferences for public goods leading to values of r~v in this interval the investment-tax-only regime dominates the saving-cum-investrnent tax regime. For completeness, this conclusion is also valid for values of r~v slightly larger than 1~-a(1 -z)e"~(e" t(1 -z)p)]'s. In all these instances, the intended or unintended omission of the saving tax instrument thus is welfare improving. The results are summarized as follows: PROPOSITION 1. Suppose that countries cannot tax profits completely and that there is some cross-ownership of firms. Then for intermediate preferences for public goods, corresponding to intermediate values for the marginal cost of public funds in the noncooperative investment-tax-only regime (i.e between 1 and some value slightly above 1~-a(1-z)e"~(e" f(1-z)p)]), welfare in that regime exceeds welfare in the noncooperative saving-cum-investment tax regime.
To reiterate, it is the temptation on the part of governments to capture profits which would otherwise accrue to foreigners that leads to overtaxation of capital income with access to both capital income tax instruments, providede preferences for public goods are not too strong. The elimination of the saving tax lessens this excess taxation, so is warranted in this situation.
tsAs well as for values of rl~equal to or slightly lazger than the minimum ot 1-o 4.2 Both saviug and investment taxation vs. ouly the former :~s statecl in Lhe introduction, seceral authors have argued that optitnally~small open ecunornies do not levv source-level investment taxes and that thus a residence-based system of capital incorrte taxation is desirable.ts 5ection`L already demonstrated that the conclusion that s-ingle countries optimally do not Ievy source-based investment taxes has to be rnocíified. once incomplete profit taxation is taken into account. 'hhis section considers tvhether a s~~stem of residence-based capital income taxation only (ancl t.hus an elirnination of thc investment tax) rnay nevertheless impro~~e tcelfare, gicen that countries fail Lo coordinate their tax policies. l~~e demonstate that going to only resiclence-based capital income taxation (from a combined resicienceand source-basecl capital income tax regime) indeed irnproves national~celfare. if proferenct~s for public goods are n~roderate enough as to Iead to a marginal cost of public fruuls (in the residence-taxat ion-only regime) close to one. Generallt', ho~ce~'er. the c~limination of source-le~~el im'cstment taxation reduces national welfare.
fu start, c~-e hace to compare the saving-im~estrnent tax~ceclge in the sa~ing cuin-in~'estment tax rogime and tho sa~ing-tax-onl~' regime (to each other and to t hef iill-coonlinatiou tax~~'ecl~e). "l'he comparison of sacing-im.estment tax wedgos iu the noncuopcrative saving-cuin-invest.mcnt tax regime and the full-coordinatiou regirue lias alroacly' beeu matle in .~ubsc~ction~. L To proceed, tce compare the noucooperat i~'e ,n~-in~; tav-onlv tax nrdgc~to the full coordinatiun tax tcedgt'. Et.~luating ( l.l). tce .oc that goiug from the sa~~ing tax-only-regimc to the full-coordination regime leads [o a~arget' sa~'ing-inve~tnteut tax tecdgc if.
1 --e.,~c~. 1 G ( i.9) I -ue, --e,~e" l -ue" I~:y. (~l.9) simpl}' reduces tu u~0, w-hich implies thal a positi~'e sa~ing tax in t hr sa~~ing-tax-unl~~regime is increased under coordination. 'Po see why~. note thal a highc,r sa~ing tax raises thc international pre-tax interest rate, r, and thus forcigncuiuitr}~sa~~ing and sa~~ing tax reveuues. In the absence of coordinatiuu. this positi~~e ostc,niality~of higlicr uational sa~.in~tas rates is ignorc~d,~~'hich gi~'es rise to a uoncoordinated sa~ing tax ratc that is too low. Conversel~~, eq. (.1.9)~night secrn to tinrgc~st that a negati~'e~ash equilibrium sacing tax is reduced evcn further uncler coorclinat.ion.~l'his is uot. the case, howe~~er." as under full coorclination there cannot osist. a negatice sa~-ing-incestment tax wedge.~Che negative saving ta~in Lhe sacin~-tax-onl~-rcgimc is financcd b~~a maximum profit tax. [nstead, coorclination lo~cers Ihc profit tax rate to restore a zero saving-investment tax~~-edge, tvhence in tlii, instance the cost of funcls is unity (rather than less than unity as in the noncoordinatc,d casc with a sacing subsidy). 1'his also implies a cutback in puhlic goods pro~ision. Coordination (starting frotn Lhe saving-tax-only regime) thus ala-ays Icacis "~l sirnilar claim is found in~lintz and Tulkens (1996) .
'"['echnically, application of the critrrion (4.9) presupposes full utilization of the profit tax in both rcgimrs. la to an increase in the saving-investment tax wedge, unless the saving tax is zero, in a.hich case it remains zero.
Finally. we compare the saving-investment tax wedge in the noncooperative saving-cum-investment tax regime and the noncooperative saving-tax-only regime. I'he simplest way to approach the question is to apply the saving-tax-only regime as the st.art.ing point, and then examine the introduction of an investment tax. First, consider that in the saving-tax-only regime the profit tax is strictly at its maximum and the saving tax is negative. The saving tax then exceeds its minimum value of -a~ ((1 -a)eu] , and the rnarginal cost of public funds,~u -1~(1 -ueu), is less than unity, but greater than the minimum value of (1 -a)eu~(eu -ap).
Vith a newly available investment tax, the marginal cost of public funds drops to (1 -a)~[1~-(1 -a)up~. triggering a positive investment tax rate. The investment tax proceeds are in part used to enhance the saving subsidy and in part to increase the provision of public goods. .a larger supply of public goods implies that the introduction of the itrvestment tax leads to a larger (less negative) overall saving-investment tax tcedge.
:~lternaticely. we can consider that the saving tax is positive in the noncooperati~-e saving-tax-only regime. 1'here then similarly is a scope for a positive investment tax if rnade available. Specifically, the introduction of the investment tax leads to a lower sacing tax rate and marginal cost of public funds, and a larger provision of public goods.~Vith an initially binding profit tax,18 the introduction ot an mvestment tax into a saving-tax-only regime thus ahvays leads to a larger noncooperative saving-investment tax wedge.ts (1 -a)e~-a z,u`~i" iff q"~i.e. iff ru ) eu -ap ' (i -a)eu
The tax wedge comparisons discussed in this subsection are reflected in Figure 4 . .~gain, the strength of preferences for public goods, as proxied by the marginal cost of public funds r~u in the noncooperative saving-tax-only regime, varies along the horizontal axis in the figure, while the vertical axis contains the saving-investment tax wedge in the uv, u ancí~regimes. The three curves -labeled xu~.~" and .rindicate how the saving-investment tax wedges in the corresponding regimes are related to the 1ICPF in the sacing-tax-only regime. In the figure, the .ru`'-curve alwavs lies above the ru-curve with the trivial exception of their common minimum point. where the profit tax is not fully utilized, and where adding the investment tax tivould be immateriaL The figure now enables us to compare national welfares under the noncooperative saving-cum-investment and noncooperative saving-tax-only regimes. In so doing, we again apply that welfare is maximized under coordination, and that welfare is concave in the saving-investment tax wedge. First, note that if p" exceeds q" in the figure (here r~" -p" corresponds to r~uv -1 f e"~p as in (4.5)), telf the profit tax does not bind, there is no scope for an investment tax.
sTo demonstrate this more formally, use (2.7) and the fatt that in the u regime, x-u, while in the ut, regime, u is related to x by (4.3).
then the saving-cum-iuvestment-tax regime clearly dominates the saving-tax-only regime. Enforcing a purely residence-based capital income tax system by agreeing to eliminate source-based in~'estment taxes thus is a bad idea for relatively strong preferences for public goods. Second, for qu in the vicinity of unity, corresponding to only rnoderate preCerences for public goods, we see that the saving-tax-only regime dominates the sa~'ing-cunr-investment tax regime. "hhis is the case where the introduction of an incestrnent tax intrument just leads to an overly high incestment tax to get at the Coreign owners of domestic firms. In this instance, a move to a residencebased-onlc tax regime is clearly welfare improving. These results are summarized as follotcs PROPOSITIO`2. Suppose that countries can only tax profits incompletely and that thcrre is sorne cross-ow~nership of firms. Then for rather moderate preferences for public goods, corresponding to values for the rnarginal cost of public Cunds around unity in the sa~ing-tax-only reginre, this rcgime w'elfare dominates the sa~'ing-cumin~'estnlent tax regime.
No foreigii firm ownership or complete profit taxation
Our anal~5is this Car has been carried out under the twin realistic assumptions that there are constraints on the extent ot profit taxation, and that there is crossownership of firnrs. For cotnpleteness, we here briefly consider the opposite cases in which either cornplete proht taxation is possible. or all firms in ecen. countr}' are owued bc domestic citizens.
If firms are owned exclusively bv domestic residents, there will be no crosscountn' profit flows. "This etfectiveh' brings us back to the setting in the paper by E3uco~'etsky and R~ilson (1991). They demonstrate that non-cooperative capital income tax policv w.ith hoth sa~~ing and incestrnent taxes corresponds completelt o the coorcíinated policy stance (and to tax policy in the paralfel closecí economy). Hence. there is no scope for policy coordination, and losing either the sa~~ing tax or the imrstment tax is bound to be detrirnental to welCare.
If profit taxes can he levied w.ithout limit, the investment tax which basically functious as a second best tax on profits disappears frorn the optimal tax package in the noncooperative tax equilibria with acceas to both saving and in~'estment taxes. Obviously, losing the in~~estment tax will then be immaterial. so that welfare le~'els in the saving-and-in~'estrnent-tax and sa~'ing-tax-only regimes are thc same. If furthermore the profit tax is fully utilized (at one ftundred percent), these two regirnes both correspond to coordinated tax policy.
However, i[ there is cross-ownership of firms, and if non-cooperative tax policy implies less than full use of the unbounded profit tax, welfare will improve if countries no longer have access to the saving tax. [n the situation in which the profit tax is not usecí in full it partly finances a saving subsidy to domestic citizens as a second best means oC transfering income from foreign owners of domestic firms to national lï resielents. Since coordination of tax policies would elirninate such a negative saviug tax, mo~ing from the sa~'ing-and-irn'estment-tax regime to the in~.estment-tax-only rcgitue a'ould clearl~' be beneficial in such a situation. 'Phus, despite the assumed acailability-of cornplete profit taxation~ce hace identified y~et another instance in rchich the loss of a capital income tax instrument~cill be~~.elfare impro~'ing.
Conclusions
l~hi~paper has compared national~~'elfare across~-arious noncooperati~'e capital income tax regimes.~hhe international tax regime for the case where there are sacing. in~~estment and profit taxation is generally inefficient r~~hen there is incomplete profit taxat ion and some foreign o~anership of dontestic firrns. entailing cross-country~profit flo~c~s. The paper shocc~s that in this sccond-best world the elimination of either the sacing tax or the iucestnrent tax may improve national~celfare in all countries. 1t present. rnost countries de jure Ie~'y' both residence-based saring taxes and source-based in~'estnrent and profit taxes. Residence-based capital income taxes. ho~cee.er. are increasingl~' rlifficult to enforce. as international capital markets berorne n;orc~integrated. I'he~crasion of residential capital income taxes could ultimatel}' Iead to t ht? effecti~'e eliminatinn nf the Laxation of sa~ing. Proposition 1 of the paper indicates that such an elimination paradoxically. may impro~'e~celfare, as it mab rin; thr sa~ing-im'estment capital income tax~~~edge closer to the tax~cedge that is optimal nnder coordination. Ihis~cill occur if preferences for public goods arc not too st rong. :~t the other estreme. a s~c'itch to exclusi~.elc residence-based capital income taxes (and thus the elimiuation of source-based investment lases). as has been recomnrended by many scholars. rnac also improve o~'erall~celfare. gi~'en the current absence of iuternational tax coordination. :1s established in Proposition ?. thi,~cill only~happen if preterences for public goods are rather u-ealc.
1'sing the techniques in this paper. a direct comparison of a combination of sacíng and profit taxes ancí a combination of inrestntent and profit taxe, can also be unclertal:en.~~'ith both incomplete profit taxation and cross-o~cnership of firms. the comparison becomes somewhat in~'ol~'ed. F.ither tax regime can in principle dominate in r~~elfare terms. .~s a general tendenc}'. horce~'er. the sa~~ing tas rcgime is ruore likely to he preferred, the largcr is thc in~-estment semi-elasticity-rclati~'e to the sa~'ing semi-elasticit~', and cice cersa.
